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The Dimensions of Passive Revolution  
 
Abstract 
Responding to the recent season of studies on Antonio Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution, the present paper will 
argue that this could fruitfully contribute to a non-deterministic understanding of capitalist dynamics. However, this 
relevance should be based on a renewed understanding of the concept itself. Against contemporary conceptualisations 
that tend to understand passive revolution as an instrument in the hands of the ruling classes, the present paper argues 
that this is better understood as originating from the shortcomings of the so-called subaltern groups. The focus should 
thus be placed on the passivity of a potentially transformative agency rather than on processes of change that are per se 
out of reach for revolutionary movements. Coming back to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, three overlapping dialectical 
relations are identified as being key to understanding both passive revolution and the struggle against it: at the 
ideational level, the dialectic between common sense and good sense; at the institutional level, the dynamic between 
bureaucratic and democratic centralism; at the level of class struggles, the dynamic between corporatism and 
universalism. Interpreted through these categories, passive revolution becomes a valuable tool both to overcome the 
fallacies of contemporary critical theory as well as to understand the challenges faced by anti-capitalist movements 
today.  
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Introduction 
One of the main theoretical references that critical scholars have relied upon in the last few decades 
in order to provide a non-deterministic understanding of capitalist dynamics is the work of the 
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Since the translation of the Prison Notebooks into English and the 
publication of the complete critical edition edited by Valentino Gerratana, Gramsci’s thought has 
produced a polymorphous variety of interpretations and applications that testify both to the 
liveliness of his thought and to the contemporary value of investigating it. In particular, the present 
paper will consider the contemporary relevance of the concept of passive revolution, suggesting that 
this could be a fruitful tool to understanding changes and stabilities in the order of capital. The 
concept of passive revolution carries great political value. In fact, it tries to respond to a 
fundamental question: ‘if the proletariat had emerged in many European countries as a collective 
social and political actor in the wake of industrialisation, why had the deepest crisis of capitalism 
not led to a revolution, but rather to various forms of capitalist reorganisation?’ (Roccu, 2017, 538). 
Far from being an out-of-date problem, this is a crucial question today as the global financial crisis 
of 2007-8 has not been followed by any substantial paradigm shift. The relevance of the term, 
however, is far from being an original contribution of the present article. In fact, the notion of 
passive revolution is nowadays a constant point of reference not only for Gramscian scholarship but 
also for fields as diverse as historical sociology, ethnography and international relations (Allinson 
and Anievas, 2010; Bruff, 2010; McKay, 2010; Nash, 2013; Simon, 2010; Wanner, 2015). The 
variety and extension of the work provided on passive revolution in the last decade would in fact 
suggest a more conscious and parsimonious use (Callinicos, 2010). In what follows, I will argue 
that in order to conceive passive revolution as a relevant tool for understanding contemporary 
capitalism, we should firstly rethink its very connotation.  
According to Peter Thomas, passive revolution for Gramsci meant ‘a distinctive process of 
(political) modernization that lacked the meaningful participation of popular classes in undertaking 
and consolidating social transformation’ (Thomas, 2013, 23). Thomas argues that ‘[i]n a certain 
sense, the concept has almost become synonymous with modernity, which is now viewed as a 
melancholy tale in which the mass of humanity is reduced to a mere spectator of a history that 
progresses without its involvement’ (2006, 73). Coming back to the Prison Notebooks, I shall argue 
that in case we are to accept the former point – passive revolution as synonymous of modernity – 
we necessarily need to criticise the second one concerning the position of the so-called subaltern 
groups within the process. In this sense, responding to the recent season of studies on passive 
revolution, the present paper will suggest that this can be seen as a synonym with modernity only so 
long as the passivity of the masses is not conceptualised as imposed by exogenous forces, but 
always-already incorporated in their everyday-praxis. In particular, three main interrelated 
dialectical relations will be identified as being key to understanding both passive revolution and the 
struggle against it: at the ideational level, the dialectic between common sense and good sense; at 
the institutional level, the dynamic between bureaucratic and democratic centralism; at the level of 
class struggles, the dynamic between corporatism and universalism. A close investigation of these 
categories in Gramsci’s oeuvre is essential in order to see how the different dimensions of passivity 
are not merely imposed on subaltern groups, but rather represent the effect of their own 
shortcomings, that can always be turned into a revolutionary upheaval.  
The present paper will be structured as follows. Firstly, I will discuss current approaches to 
the concept of passive revolution, particularly focusing on its recent reception in studies in critical 
political economy. Secondly, I will provide a critique of current approaches to the term and, coming 
back to the Prison Notebooks, I will suggest an alternative reading revolving around the 
aforementioned categories.  In particular, I shall argue that it is only by seeing the seeds of capital 
restructuring already at play in the every-day practice of the subaltern groups, that Gramsci is able 
to think their potential for emancipation. Ultimately, I will conclude by summarising the possible 
contribution of a renewed understanding of passive revolution for both studies in critical theory and 
for redefining the challenges of anti-capitalist  movements today. 
 
Domination without hegemony? Passive Revolution in the Literature 
Recent scholarship touching upon the notion of passive revolution, particularly within critical 
political economy, has revolved around the issue of how far we can extend this concept and the 
extent to which this is an apt representation of how changes and stability work in contemporary 
capitalism. Three main interventions have been recently made in this regard. Firstly, Adam Morton 
suggests that passive revolution today is a ‘portmanteau concept that reveals the continuities and 
changes within the order of capital’ (2007, 68). In this sense, Morton agrees with Peter Thomas in 
arguing that passive revolution has become almost a synonym with modernity, and a particularly 
apt notion to explain both capitalist state formation and maintenance (Morton, 2010, 322; see also 
McKay, 2010). In critiquing such an approach, Alex Callinicos argues that this definition brings 
about an issue in terms of distinguishing different situations. In this sense, passive revolution would 
lose its own specificity thus becoming ‘a distinction without difference’ (2010, 505). Relying on 
Gramsci’s uses of the term, Callinicos argues that, for example, the analogy between Risorgimento 
and Fordism fails to recognise a crucial difference between the two processes. Only the former 
seems in fact to appear as a plausible representation of passive revolution inasmuch as ‘the ancien 
régime has given way to a society in the capitalist mode of production prevails’ (Ivi, 498). It is thus 
argued that the emphasis should be placed on the passage from one mode of production to another, 
not extending the use of passive revolution to transition within capitalism. In fact, Callinicos 
continues, neither fascism nor Fordism produced a systemic transformation and thus these are better 
seen as ‘counter-revolutionary projects that seek to manage the structural contradictions of the 
capitalist mode of production, not the accomplishment of socialist transformation by other means’ 
(Ibidem). Callinicos thus concludes that what we need is a more restricted understanding of passive 
revolution, in order not to make it interfere with other concepts such as that of counter-revolution. A 
third approach that tries to integrate the previous two interpretations is the one delineated by 
Roberto Roccu, who criticises Morton for the over-extension of its use of the term while at the same 
time contesting the idea that passive revolution somehow needs to produce a transition to a new 
mode of production, as in Callinicos. In particular, Roccu stresses the importance that the partial 
fulfilment of people’s demands has in what Gramsci defines as passive revolution – something that 
finds only limited echo in Morton’s formulation (Roccu, 2017, 549).   
Whilst such a discussion is certainly of theoretical relevance, I shall argue that the extension 
or limitations of passive revolution can only be rethought via a renewed understanding of Gramsci’s 
usage. Notwithstanding the differences highlighted in the previous conceptualisations, in fact, the 
three authors tend to agree in understanding the outcome of passive revolution as being ultimately 
in the hands of the ruling classes – something that seems in contrast with Gramsci’s treatment in the 
Prison Notebooks. The existing literature acknowledges that the phenomenon of passive revolution 
originates from the limits of bourgeois rule (Morton, 2013, 55). In this sense, the process is seen to 
represent a response to dynamics that ruling circles do not directly control. These dynamics can 
vary from crisis-induced contradictions amongst ruling class fractions in which its progressive force 
tends to deteriorate (Q1§44, 42), to external shifts in the accumulation process forced by uneven 
tendencies in capitalist development (Morton, 2011, 36), or from subaltern challenges to the 
established hegemonic bloc. Nevertheless, the outcome of passive revolution is often seen as 
heavily dependent on ruling classes’ power.  
In his book on Mexico, Morton proposes two definitions of passive revolution: first, ‘a 
revolution without mass participation, or a “revolution from above,” involving elite engineered 
social and political reform that draws on foreign capital and associated ideas while lacking a 
national-popular base’ (Ivi, 38); second, a situation in which ‘a revolutionary form of political 
transformation is pressed into a conservative project of restoration’ (Ivi, 39). Although, the two 
definitions are in some respects different, they both imply a top-down force that produces a 
conservative form of change, either by not including the subalterns in the process or by displacing 
their demands. This might be only a matter of emphasis. In fact, Morton acknowledges that in the 
process of passive revolution a significant role is played by the shortcomings of counter-hegemonic 
projects. For example, he argues that 
[i]n the case of Italy, the “passive” aspect refers to the restrictive form of hegemony that emerged out of the 
Risorgimento because of the failure of potential ‘Jacobins’ in the Partito d’Azione to establish a program 
reflecting the demands of the popular masses and, significantly, the peasantry (Morton, 2013, 52). 
In addition, many of Morton’s analyses of Gramsci’s texts as well as applications to concrete 
examples remark the importance of acknowledging the limits of movements of opposition vis-à-vis 
capital, and of not considering bourgeois rule as a ‘quasi-automatic’ process (2011, 46). This is 
shown, for example, by his sensitivity towards the backwardness of the Italian peripheral forces in 
Southern Italy before the Risorgimento (2007, 62), as well as towards the lack of a united front 
based on the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry during the revolutionary upheaval in 
Mexico (2011, 45-6). Yet, Morton never theoretically elaborates on what the key features of such 
shortcomings are and on the extent to which these influence and facilitate capitalist restructuring 
itself. For this reason, passive revolution is ultimately seen as a process in the hands of the ruling 
bloc – that, although at times is forced to accommodate requests from below, it always does so 
within the existing social formation given its privileged position within the state (Ivi, 53; Sassoon 
1987, 207). In analysing the Italian Risorgimento, for example, whilst acknowledging the 
deficiencies of the Action Party, Morton ultimately sees passive revolution as representing ‘the 
inability of the ruling class to fully integrate the producer classes through conditions of hegemony’ 
(Morton 2007, 68). Given the absence of hegemony, he adds, the state becomes crucial in order to 
further capitalist dominance (Ivi: 102). Morton applies similar considerations to the process of 
capitalist developments in Mexico, where the peasants’ revolution ended up being offset by 
‘Mexican populism’ that had ‘counterrevolutionary roots based on the domination and manipulation 
of the masses behind the façade of revolutionary rhetoric’ (Morton, 2011, 48). In this sense ‘passive 
revolution … is a revolution, marked by violent social upheaval, involving a relatively small state 
class engaging with “the acceptance of certain demands from below” in order to restrict class 
struggle, while insuring the creation of state power and an institutional framework consonant with 
capitalist property relations’ (Morton 2013: 54; original emphasis). In Morton’s account is implied 
something that we will see developed more clearly in Callinicos and Roccu: namely, a juxtaposition 
(rather an interrelation) of the revolutionary upheavals of the subaltern and the potential for the 
ruling classes to restructure order and hegemony. Rather than seeing the former as limiting (and 
potentially impeding) the possibility of the latter, Morton seems to argue that the more requests 
from below become pervasive the more the ruling classes’ privileged access to the state becomes 
crucial in order to restructure society. This point will be better explained by referring to the 
arguments made by Callinicos and Roccu.  
 
Postulating or Presupposing? The Antithetical Treatment of the Antithesis 
Roccu attempts to move beyond Morton’s interpretation, suggesting that the emphasis should be 
placed on the partial fulfilment of people’s demands which, he argues, is exactly the means that 
produces masses’ passivity. He acknowledges the ambivalence of Gramsci’s application of passive 
revolution, as in some occasions this ‘is presented as a residual strategy deployed to maintain power 
when hegemony is lacking (“dictatorship without hegemony”)’, whilst in other passages of the 
Prison Notebooks ‘passive revolution seems to occur under conditions of limited, fractured, 
hegemony, when a class or fraction thereof is hegemonic towards some others but not across 
society’ (2017, 546). Such a remark, however, does not result in a sceptical position as in 
Callinicos. In fact, Roccu is convinced that we can extrapolate a core from Gramsci’s multi-facet 
engagement with passive revolution. This core is made of four elements, of which the first two are 
presuppositions, the third has to do with its specific method, and the fourth with its outcome. The 
first element is linked to the international situation that in periods of structural changes requires 
‘from specific state formations an attempt to developmental catch-up through transition, both from a 
non-capitalist to a capitalist mode of production…and between different regimes of capital 
accumulation’ (Ivi, 545). Secondly, Roccu refers to Gramsci’s use of Hegel’s categories in order to 
contend that passive revolution also presupposes a thesis that, despite its limitations, ‘develops to 
the full of its potential for struggle’ (Q15§11), while the antithesis is incapable of doing the same. 
Thirdly, in terms of method, Roccu argues that crucial for passive revolution is an heavy reliance on 
state power by the ruling classes in order ‘to weaken and defuse the political potential of subaltern 
classes’ (Roccu, 2017, 545). Lastly, as it pertains to the outcome, passive revolution combines a real 
transformation, ‘either towards or within capitalism’ (Ivi, 546), and, at the same time, the ‘partial 
fulfilment and displacement of the demands raised by the embryonic subaltern bloc’ (Ibidem).  
This attempt at extrapolating the core of passive revolution from Gramsci’s writings is 
certainly valuable if one wants to define the limits and potentiality of the term, perhaps moving 
beyond both Morton’s overextension and Callinicos’ excessive scepticism vis-à-vis its use. Yet, 
what is puzzling in Roccu’s formulation is that the weakness of the antithesis is emphasised as 
being both a presupposition and a result of the process. This already makes it difficult to understand 
what the contribution of passive revolution would be, if the passivity that this is supposed to impose 
on the subaltern bloc (Ivi, 550) is in fact there from the beginning. On the other hand, this basic 
presupposition is questioned by Roccu himself. In fact, when criticising Morton for under-
appreciating the role played by the partial fulfilment of popular demands, he argues that much more 
emphasis should be placed on ‘the presence of a vigorous antithesis prior to a passive revolution’ 
(Ibidem; my emphasis). Also Callinicos (2010, 501) makes the same point, as he argues that 
actually the vigorous antithesis is a basic feature to a passive revolution. The justification for this 
idea is found in a quote from Notebook 15, where Gramsci (Q15§62, 1827) argues that ‘the 
conception [of passive revolution] remains a dialectical one – in other words, presupposes, and 
indeed postulates as necessary [presuppone, anzi postula come necessaria], a vigorous antithesis 
which can present intransigently all its potentiality for development.’ Callinicos seems to 
completely misread the meaning of this formulation, as he takes it to suggest that in order to have a 
passive revolution we need a strong antithesis. Gramsci’s position is actually the opposite: it is in 
order to avoid a passive revolution that the antithesis needs to develop to its full potential.  
This is clear already from the quoted note Q15§62, where Gramsci provides the 
aforementioned argument in order to prevent any ‘historical defeatism’ and ‘fatalism’ associated 
with the term passive revolution, particularly in reference to the Italian Risorgimento. In fact, he 
also adds that passive revolution is not to be understood as a political program, but rather as 
‘criterion of interpretation in absence of other active elements in a dominant manner’ (Ibidem). This 
becomes even more evident when looking at Gramsci’s treatment of the Risorgimento and the 
relation between the Action Party and Cavour’s project of modernisation. Borrowing an expression 
of Vittorio Emanuele II, he argues that the Moderates had their opponents in their pockets, given the 
latter’s inability to form a real hegemonic alternative to Cavour’s leadership (Q1§44, 41-2). In fact, 
‘the Moderates represented a relatively homogenous class … whilst the Action Party was not based 
on any historical class and the oscillations that its governing bodies experienced ultimately followed 
the interests of the Moderates’ (Ivi, 40-1). For Gramsci, the moderate bloc should be understood as 
being a dominant class in two manners: ‘it is leading [dirigente] of the allied classes and dominant 
[dominante] of the opposing classes’ (Ivi, 41). The distinction between leading and dominant is 
often understood as marking two opposite alternative forms of government, which would give the 
ruling classes the option to choose according to the specific situation to use coercive mechanisms in 
order to retain power when hegemony is absent. Nevertheless, Gramsci promptly remarks that a 
certain class must possess political hegemony before taking governmental power, and also once it 
has become dominant ‘it continues to be “leading”’ (Ibidem). The example of the Risorgimento 
proves exactly this. In fact, the Moderates ‘continued to lead [dirigere]’, and not merely to 
dominate, ‘the Action Party also after 1870.’ It is, thus, exactly thanks to this cultural and political 
subalternity of the antithesis that the ruling bloc is capable of using the state as a means to integrate 
also the sporadic active elements in the opposing forces (for example, through the phenomenon that 
Gramsci names trasformismo).  
The emphasis on the presupposition of a strong antithesis seems also to remove one of the two 
preconditions that Roccu argued were constituting the core of Gramsci’s concept: namely, a lacking 
antithesis. In this sense, passive revolution seems to describe two possible situations. On the one 
hand, a situation in which both capitalist class and its opponents are weak; on the other hand, a 
condition in which they are both powerful at the same time. This schematic and abstract 
representation already shows something interesting regarding current approaches to the term: 
namely, the fact that thesis and antithesis are not dialectically related, but rather abstractly 
juxtaposed. The growing power of the antithesis does not per se reduce the potential for the thesis to 
respond, but rather surprisingly increases it. Conversely, the weakness of movements of opposition 
is not seen as necessarily implying a relative position of dominance for the ruling classes. The result 
is that passive revolution is invoked to represent a situation of relative equilibrium between 
opposing fractions, with the necessary clause that at the end the struggle is going to be solved by the 
favourable position of the ruling bloc within the state.1 This is further proved by the fact that both in 
Callinicos and Roccu passive revolution is seen as opposed to counter-revolution and hegemony, 
two situations in which the capitalist class is thought as being relatively stronger than its opposition. 
Failure to link the lack of a strong antithesis to the empowerment of the dominant class, ultimately 
forces us to view passive revolution as ‘a backup strategy for a ruling class that fails to be 
hegemonic and thus relies on its control of state power and a favourable balance of political forces 
to perpetuate its own political dominance under new structural conditions’ (Roccu, 2017, 556; my 
emphasis). 
 
Hegemony and Passive Revolution: The Zero-Sum Game of Political Struggles 
Degenerations of such an approach could be found, for example, in Ian Bruff’s account of Agenda 
2010 in Germany, where passive revolution is explicitly contrapposed to hegemony (Bruff, 2010; 
see also Coutinho, 2007 and Losurdo, 1997, 155). It is true that Gramsci himself refers to certain 
historical developments to be the result of a condition of ‘dictatorship without hegemony’ 
(Q15§59); yet, if taken literally, this formulation can be highly misleading. The reason for this can 
be exposed by looking at Gramsci’s treatment of the disaggregation and reconstruction of the 
hegemonic group after World War I. Gramsci’s line of thought is the following: 
First of all, why has it disaggregated? Perhaps because a strong collective and antagonistic political will has 
developed? If that was the case, the problem would have been solved in favour of this antagonistic force. It has 
disaggregated, rather, because of purely mechanic causes of different type: 1) because great masses, previously 
passive, started moving [sono entrate in movimento], but in a chaotic and disorganised movement, without 
direction, i.e.: without a precise collective political will; 2) Because the middle classes that during the war had a 
position of leadership and command, have lost it during the time of peace … 3) Because the antagonistic forces 
resulted incapable of organising for their own advantage such disorder (Q7§80: 912-3; author’s translation and 
emphasis).  
It is certainly true that there is a substantial difference between a purely a-critical mass of people 
that passively accepts the ruling order (thus fully accepting its position of leadership and command) 
and one that moves against it, though in a chaotic and un-organised manner. However, as it is clear 
from this passage, the absence of an organic collective will is the ultimate reason why oppositions 
do not manage to move beyond, and thus end up re-precipitating into, the previous hegemonic bloc. 
Here it is probably worth referring to what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in a rather critical 
account of Gramscian understanding of hegemony, define as the ‘zero-sum game of political 
struggles […] where a failure in the hegemony of the working class can only be  followed by a 
reconstitution of bourgeois hegemony’ (2014, 59).  This means that passive revolution, in Gramsci, 
should not be seen as opposed to hegemony; but rather as describing a situation in which failures to 
produce a creative moment force the subaltern to recapitulate, nolens volens, into the previous 
hegemonic bloc. 
As it has been argued in this section, current approaches to passive revolution not only are at 
times philologically inconsistent with Gramsci’s text but they also present at least three issues in the 
conceptualisation of movements of opposition and their relation vis-à-vis capitalist restructuring. 
                                                          
1 This approach can be seen also in Roccu’s (2017, 555) treatment of the Tunisian restructuring after Ben Ali’s 
overthrowing, considered as exemplary of what Gramsci calls passive revolution. Roccu, in fact, seems not to consider 
the absence of a Jacobin moment in Tunisia as the primary reason for capitalist restructuring. 
Firstly, the great emphasis placed on the potential of the ruling bloc to use state power seems to 
undermine (both theoretically and practically) any potential for revolutionary politics. Secondly, and 
connected to the first point, the aforementioned approaches are unable to account for strengths and 
weaknesses of movements of resistance vis-à-vis capitalist restructuring, mainly because they do 
not see the two realms as dialectically interrelated, and a strengthening of the former could always 
be repressed by impositions from the later. In fact, and this is the third point, the strong antithesis of 
the subaltern, even when emphasised, appears as being never enough when compared to capital’s 
ability to restructure the social order. In what follows, I will suggest that engaging with Gramsci’s 
notion of passive revolution could be useful to move beyond these fallacies. In particular, I shall 
argue that it is only by seeing the seeds of capitalist restructuring always-already at play in the 
every-day praxis of the subaltern classes, that Gramsci is able to conceptualise the potential for 
revolutionary politics.  
 
Passive Revolution in the Prison Notebooks: Passivity Revisited 
Given the aforementioned criticisms to current approaches to passive revolution, this section will 
argue that Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualisation of changes and stability within the capitalist society 
has the potential to re-establish a connection between struggles and socio-historical development. 
Against the general conceptualisation of current studies that think the Gramscian analyses of 
passive revolution as a process that is ultimately in the hands of the ruling classes, I  suggest that 
this is better understood as being based on the passivity of a potentially transformative agency. The 
notion of passive revolution was firstly formulated by Vincenzo Cuoco, who employed it in order to 
understand the lack of involvement of the popular masses in the Neapolitan revolution of 1799. 
Gramsci argues that whilst Cuoco meant it as a ‘warning to create a national mood of greater energy 
and popular revolutionary initiative’, the term was soon converted by the Moderates and the neo-
Guelphs ‘into a positive conception, into a political programme’ that concealed ‘the determination 
to abdicate and capitulate at the first serious threat of an Italian revolution that would be profoundly 
popular, i.e.: radically national’ (1971, 59f, Q10§6, 1220). The idea of passive revolution as a 
process crucially dependent on the shortcomings of subaltern groups is well encapsulated in a note 
that Gramsci writes in Notebook 8, where he criticises the idea of mechanicism as explaining 
capitalist stability. Gramsci argues that 
when the subaltern becomes diligent and responsible, mechanicism appears sooner or later as an imminent peril 
[…] the limits and the dominance of the force of things are restricted, why? Because, at the end, whereas 
yesterday the subaltern was a thing, today he is not a thing anymore but a historical person; whereas yesterday he 
was irresponsible because he resisted an external will, today he is irresponsible because he does not resist, 
despite being an active agent. But has he ever been mere resistance, mere thing, mere irresponsibility? Certainly 
not, and that is why it is always necessary to demonstrate the futility of mechanic determinism (Q8§205, 1064; 
author’s translation). 
Stability is thus not the product of external impositions, rather it is dependent on the passive role 
played by the subaltern groups that (actively) help in reproducing the current system of 
exploitation.2 In fact, Gramsci warns us that ‘it is never to be forgotten that historical development 
follows the laws of necessity only so long as the initiative has not decisively passed on the side of 
those forces that aim at the construction according to a plan, of pacific and sympathetic division of 
                                                          
2 For a similar argument see Finocchiaro, 1973.  
labour’ (Q14§68, 1729; author’s translation). Passivity is thus related to the lack of political 
initiative of the subalterns. In this sense, Gramsci not only provides us with useful theoretical tools 
to criticise the vulgar materialism associated with Nikolai Bukharin that understands the subaltern 
classes as ontologically deprived of will. The Prison Notebooks conversely criticise the idea that the 
masses are always-already active. In fact, as he argues in a famous passage, ‘the philosophy of 
praxis […] is not an instrument of government of the dominant groups in order to gain the consent 
of and exercise hegemony over the subaltern classes; it is the expression of these subaltern classes 
who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowing all 
truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in avoiding the (impossible) deceptions of the upper class and 
– even more – their own’ (Gramsci, 1995, 395-6; Q10§41xii, 1320). Continuity in the order of 
capital is thus not rooted in external impositions or in the rationalisation of society operated by 
institutional apparatuses, but rather in the self-deception of potentially oppositional social groups. 
Therefore, a strong antithesis, rather than being the basic condition for a passive revolution, as 
Callinicos and Roccu would have it, is the primary antidote to it.  
It thus becomes crucial to understand what is involved in the passage from a state of passivity 
to one of creative activity. Returning to the Prison Notebooks, three overlapping dialectical 
relations are identified as being key to Gramsci’s understanding of this relation: at the ideational 
level, the dialectic between common sense and good sense; at the institutional level, the dynamic 
between bureaucratic and democratic centralism; at the level of class struggles, the dynamic 
between corporatism and universalism. This analysis is not meant to suggest an abstract 
fragmentation of Gramsci’s holistic thought. As I will show, in concrete situations, these 
dimensions are indeed very much interrelated. The purpose of analysing them separately, however, 
can be seen as threefold. First, it will help me to emphasise Gramsci’s treatment of the manifold 
roots of popular passivity and its implication for rethinking popular agency. Secondly, I will be able 
to demonstrate that such passivity is not seen as being imposed on the subaltern through the backup 
strategies of the ruling class, but rather it is always part of dynamics internal to the subaltern 
themselves. Thirdly, I will argue that Gramsci takes such passivity as the main reason why the 
ruling class is capable of keeping and reinforcing its position of dominance. I will thus argue that it 
is on these levels that the Prison Notebooks identify the challenges faced by revolutionary projects, 
that do not limit themselves to accept the already established structures, but want to engage in the 
creation of a new state. For the reasons highlighted in the previous section, these dimensions can 
also be seen as different levels on which the ability of the subalterns to emancipate themselves from 
pre-established hegemonies – and thus create their own – is articulated. In turn, I will take into 
consideration both the role that they play in the perpetration of capitalist dominance as well as the 
political project that they point towards if one wants to overcome it.   
 
Common sense and good sense  
As anticipated, the struggle against passive revolution at the ideological level is identified with the 
dialectic between common sense and good sense. In Gramsci, this dichotomy is at the core of the 
relationship between intellectuals and people-nation. Whilst common sense is an incoherent stage of 
opinion formation, good sense is realised once people begin to think coherently and organically to 
their everyday life experience, thus producing their own intellectuals. In the Prison Notebooks good 
sense is thus the embodiment of philosophy in society. Gramsci significantly argues for a strict 
connection between philosophy and common sense, suggesting that we would need a history of 
common sense in order to investigate the genesis of the problems that are reflected only in a 
minimal part in the history of philosophy. This would ultimately ‘help to demonstrate their real 
value (if they still have one) or the significance that they have as overcome links of a chain and to 
individuate the new and actual problems or the actual stage of old problems’ (Q11§12, 1383; 
author’s translation). The value which is alluded to here is that coming from the connection 
‘between intellectuals who “know” and the “people-nation” that merely “feels”’ (Fontana, 2015, 
57). These two are strictly connected, as there is no ‘high culture’ that has not germinated from 
everyday-issues and, conversely, no philosophical speculation is meaningful if it is unable to speak 
to people’s problems. The Prison Notebooks thus recognise both the importance of and the 
necessity to overcome common sense, thought as both being the necessary point of departure of 
critical intellectual activity and, at the same time, as one of the main obstacles that keep the 
subalterns in their position of passivity and prevent them from becoming hegemonic.  
Therefore, not only is there a common ideological feature shared by both fragmented common 
sense and what Gramsci calls ‘high culture’ (alta cultura) – that proper to those intellectuals that 
construct a coherent philosophy detached from the masses and functional to socio-political 
domination. More radically, for Gramsci, these are two sides of the same coin: ‘high culture’ can be 
coherently articulated and used as a means of dominion only so long as common sense is 
fragmented and incoherent. The Prison Notebooks thus radically detach themselves from the 
physiological readings of ideology à la Bukharin, also developed by the idéologues. It is ultimately 
the recognition of the historical, thus potentially criticisable, nature of ideas to give the ‘philosophy 
of praxis’ its non-deterministic character. Ideology, for Gramsci, is not a pre-constituted set of ideas 
that is to be merely installed by the dominant groups into the minds of the subaltern classes. This is 
ultimately far from a coherent monolith: ‘[s]ome participate in ideology because of their position in 
the world of production, others for their participation in disaggregated world of common sense; 
there are those that produce ideology from their position as great intellectuals and those that do so 
as simple “clerks of the dominant group”’ (Filippini, 2012, 94; author’s translation). This manifold 
manifestation of the ideological production points also to the fact that the incoherent rejection of the 
ruling class’ intellectual production, per se, does not imply a complete emancipation. An example 
can be found in Notebook 3, where Gramsci discusses the position of peasants in Southern Italy 
(defined as morti di fame, the ‘starvelings’) and their ‘generic’ hate for the so-called ‘masters’ 
(Q3§46, 323) matured in conjunction with the highly uneven development of the Italian state since 
the beginning of the 19th century. The polemic position of the peasantry, Gramsci argues, can be 
seen as a primary level of rejection of the constituted order; but at the same time it is insufficient to 
build ‘class consciousness’ inasmuch as ‘not only does it not have an exact consciousness of its 
own historical personality, but it does not even have the consciousness of the historical personality 
and limits of its opponent’ (Ivi, 323-4). This also escalates into the collaboration of the most 
productive sections of the morti di fame (those that aspire to small municipal jobs or to positions of 
clerk in the city) with the local bourgeoisie against the peasantry. The backward praxis of peripheral 
groups is thus understood as giving rise to a vague ‘cosmopolitanism’ that proves inadequate to 
build a revolutionary position based on a thorough knowledge of the state and on an organic class 
consciousness. Gramsci ultimately attributes a stage on ‘non-activity’ (linked to the lack of 
‘comprehension of one’s own role’) to the sporadic and subversive actions of the morti di fame, and 
argues that this needs to be linked to ‘“subversion” from above, thus … an arbitrary politics and of 
a personal or group clique [cricca personale o di gruppo]’ (Ivi, 326-7; author’s translation). This 
makes clear that, in Gramsci, the leading position of restricted groups is always mirrored (and in 
some sense is the epiphenomenon of) the cultural passivity of the subalterns. Or, as Robert Jackson 
puts it, ‘the sedimented layers of the anachronistic tradition continue to be reproduced not simply 
from above, but by the very groups that stand to benefit from the negation of their influence’ 
(Jackson, 2016, 221). As it is clear from the example of the morti di fame, Gramsci connects the 
inconsistent intellectual production of subaltern groups both to the fragmentation of struggles and to 
the bureaucratisation of politics that leaves coercive power in the hands of a restricted group of 
people. These other dimensions on which passivity is articulated and reproduced will be analysed in 
the following sub-sections.  
 
Bureaucratic centralism and democratic centralism 
Gramsci defines bureaucratic centralism as the dominion of a part over the whole, whilst 
democratic centralism is ‘centralism in motion’ [centralismo in movimento], thus a continuous 
adjustment of the organization to the real historical development’ (Q9§68, 1139; author’s 
translation). Bureaucracy plays a crucial role in ensuring the continuity of capital as it is ‘the most 
dangerous habitual and conservative force’ (Q13§23, 1604; author’s translation). Institutional 
dynamics are therefore a primary example to be taken into consideration if we are to understand the 
‘non-contemporaneity of the present’ (Thomas, 2009).  In this emphasis on the connection between 
bureaucracy and the continuation of capitalist dominance, Gramsci shares a concern that is common 
among contemporary critical studies – particularly those that highlight the role played by strong 
institutions in ensuring the endurance of capital’s laws (Bonefeld, 2015, 2017; Ryner, 2015). Yet, 
the identification of the sources of such bureaucratic structure seem to be radically different in the 
two cases. Whilst the reference to strong institutions usually alludes to the displacement of an 
otherwise already democratic stance of change, for Gramsci bureaucracy is possible only in virtue 
of masses’ passivity. In fact, he argues that ‘it needs to be stressed that the unhealthy manifestations 
of bureaucratic centralism occurred because of a lack of initiative and responsibility at the bottom, 
in other words because of the political immaturity of the peripheral forces, even when these were 
homogeneous with the hegemonic territorial group’ (Gramsci, 1971, 189; Q9§68, 1139). In 
synthesis, it is only by seeing the seeds of bureaucracy in the everyday shortcomings of potentially 
transformative agency that Gramsci is able to conceive an overcoming of bureaucratic centralism. 
Against such static structures, in fact, 
democratic centralism offers an elastic formula, which can be embodied in many diverse forms; it comes alive in 
so far as it is interpreted and continually adapted to necessity. It consists in the critical pursuit of what is identical 
in seeming diversity of form and on the other hand of what is distinct and even opposed in apparent uniformity, 
in order to organise and interconnect closely that which is similar, but in such a way that the organising and the 
interconnecting appear to be a practical and ‘inductive’ necessity, experimental, and not the result of 
rationalistic, deductive, abstract process – i.e.: one typical of pure intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971, 189; Q13§36).  
Democratic centralism, therefore, can be seen as the truest realisation of the unity of theory and 
praxis, which involves an organic connection between the intellectual strata and the popular masses 
as well as between the rulers and the ruled (Gramsci, 1971, 190). Gramsci thus points towards the 
need to move beyond bureaucratic systems, beginning with the awareness of the main reasons that 
brought about bureaucracy in the first place and, therefore, identifying the aspects on which the 
subaltern can work to overcome it.  This will ultimately give collective subjects, rather than isolated 
individuals, the possibility to produce real historical change (Filippini, 2017, 51). This critically 
shows the interrelations between the overcoming of bureaucratic centralism and the need to move 
both beyond occasional and fragmented opinion and beyond disaggregated forms of struggles, in 
order to create a collective subjectivity. This will be best understood by looking at the following 
sub-section. 
Corporatism and Universalism 
In a note called Alcuni aspetti teorici e pratici dell’ ‘economicismo’, Gramsci argues that 
movements of resistance should not be solely studied via the lenses of economic activity, ‘as this 
affirms an immediate element of force, thus the availability of a certain financial supply direct or 
indirect… and that’s it. Too little. Also in this case, the analysis of the different degrees of relation 
[gradi di rapporto] of forces cannot but culminate in the sphere of hegemonic and of ethico-
political relations’ (Q13§18, 1597; author’s translation). In fact, Gramsci’s understanding of 
revolutionary politics should be understood as articulated on three levels (see Frosini, 2010). 
Firstly, an organization based on an homogeneous social group linked to professional relations 
within a certain group. Here we have the mere corporatist phase typical of the organizzazioni di 
mestiere. Secondly, the group develops the consciousness of solidarity but still purely within the 
economic realm. Thirdly, we have a phase in which  
consciousness of one’s corporatist interests…overcome the corporatist realm of the economic circle, and can and 
should become the interests of other groups subordinated. This is the phase more explicitly political… 
determining beyond the economic unity and politics also the intellectual and cultural unity, not on a corporatist 
realm, but rather on a universal one, of hegemony (Q4§38, 457; author’s translation).   
Praxis par exellance in Gramsci is thus not that of economic activity, but rather the ethico-political 
production. It is only through the creation of a new hegemony that the ‘structure ceases to be an 
external force which crushes man, assimilates him to itself and makes him passive; and it is 
transformed into a means of freedom’ (Gramsci 1971, 367; Q10§6, 1244). Such a dynamic was 
already emphasised in Gramsci’s polemic against trade unions for remaining still within the realm 
of economic competition, and in the comparison with the Factory Councils which were more apt to 
create a revolutionary alternative, based not only on the competition between classes, but on a new 
ethico-political system and on the self-government of the working class (Gramsci, 2016). In 
particular, whilst trade unions were acknowledged as being a positive organism to move beyond 
workers complete subalternity vis-à-vis capital, their action was necessarily also conservative as 
their very organisation made sense only within the borders of a capitalist system. In Gramsci’s 
(2000, 93) words, ‘[t]he emergence of an industrial legality is a great victory for the working class, 
but it is not the ultimate and definitive victory.’ For this reason, Gramsci criticised the approach to 
unionism of organisations such as the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL) and its metal-
mechanic affiliate, the Federazione Italiana Operai Metallurgici (FIOM). This is again a situation 
in which a purely passive and alienated mass of workers can be distinguished from forms of 
organisations, such as unions, that help in producing a critical consciousness of one’s position. Yet, 
in both cases the antithesis tends to fall back into the previous hegemonic bloc, in as much as it does 
not create a hegemonic moment of its own. This idea in Gramsci is ripped of any form of 
determinism, as he argues that ‘[t]he trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon. It becomes a 
determinate institution, i.e. it takes on a definite historical form to the extent that the strength and 
will of the workers who are its members impress a policy and propose an aim that define it’ (Ivi, 
92). Gramsci also adds that 
[i]f the trade-union officials regard industrial legality as a necessary, but not a permanently necessary 
compromise; if they deploy all the means at the union's disposal to improve the balance of forces in favour of the 
working class; and if they carry out all the spiritual and material preparatory work that will be needed if the 
working class is to launch at any particular moment a victorious offensive against capital and subject it to its law 
then the trade union is a tool of revolution, and union discipline, even when used to make the workers respect 
industrial legality, is revolutionary discipline (Ivi, 93). 
Ultimately, the success or failure of trade unionism to sublate itself and develop into a revolutionary 
movement is dependent on the capacity of hegemonic production of the workers and people that 
compose it. In the same manner, the defeat of the Factory Councils in the 1920s proved that the 
absence of coordination of revolutionary forces makes it possible for moderates to incorporate them 
into a conservative project (Salvadori, 2018, 151-61).  
 
Conclusion 
As previously remarked, in 1933 Gramsci suggested that passive revolution should not be confused 
for a political project, but it can guide praxis only to the extent that it ‘assumes, or postulates as 
necessary, a vigorous antithesis’ (Q15§62, 1827).3 In Gramsci, the historical subject is thus not 
shaped by pre-existing structures but proves its autonomy in actively recomposing and overcoming 
given conditions, crucially emancipating itself ‘from  the fallacies of representation and perception 
of life that that subject, being subaltern, necessarily possesses in itself at the beginning’ (Finelli, 
2011; author’s translation). Objective historical conditions are, therefore, never the ultimate 
explanatory tool to understand the failure of a revolutionary project, and conversely only a project 
capable of moving beyond immediate reality to produce a creative moment of its own can overcome 
passivity and become hegemonic. In fact, 
[m]ass action is not possible while the masses remain unconvinced of the purposes it is pursuing or the means to 
achieve them. If it is to become a governing class, the proletariat must rid itself of all the residue of corporatism, 
of every syndicalist prejudice. What does this mean? It means that not only must the divisions between different 
jobs be overcome, but that to achieve consensus and to win the trust of the peasants and some of the semi-
proletarian urban masses some prejudices have to be addressed as well as elements of egotism which still persist 
among workers even when they have left behind craft particularisms. The metal worker, the carpenter, the 
building worker will need to learn to see themselves as members of a class that will lead the peasants and the 
intellectuals, a class that can only win and build socialism if it is supported and followed by the majority of 
society. If it does not achieve that […] it will give the state the possibility of crushing the rising tide of workers’ 
struggles and breaking the movement (quoted in Robaina, 2006; my emphasis). 
The link is thus evident between the potential for the bourgeoisie to impose coercively its own 
control over society and the fallacies of subalterns’ attempt to become true organic subjectivity 
(Badaloni, 2014, 102). The coerciveness of capital restructuring would in fact not be possible if it 
was not for the ideological (common sense), organizational (bureaucratic centralism) and interest-
based (corporatism) fragmentation of potentially revolutionary social groups. Gramsci seems to 
reverse the general insight of critical theorists according to whom we can understand the 
continuation of capitalist practices as the result of increasing rationalisation and coerciveness of the 
capitalist system. In this light, future studies should point not only to the significance of Gramsci in 
grappling with crucial theoretical concepts which allow us to overcome the fallacies of 
contemporary critical studies. At the same time, the Prison Notebooks could be a fruitful source to 
point in the direction of alternative lines of research that not only focus on how mechanisms of 
government tend to impose capitalist dynamics but also to how such logics are asserted, reproduced 
and can potentially be contested from the subalterns themselves. This challenges us to identify and 
perpetrate the forms of praxis that are capable of offsetting the dead mechanisms that seem to 
mechanically rule over our everyday life. Having this as an objective, the concept of passive 
revolution can be an important tool both to guide political praxis and to provide a coherent 
understanding of the connection between capitalist dominance and its potentially contested nature.  
 
 
                                                          
3 For accounts that consider passive revolution as a political project see e.g.: Callinicos, 2010; Vianna, 1998. 
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